There are two ways in which the avoidance of **trivialism** can fail . One is to accept the classical equivalence of negation - and absolute inconsistency.

— Dov M. Gabbay, Franz Guenthner, in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume 11, Springer, 31 March 2004, p.273

...a border line case of a bearded person may be admitted as both bearded and not bearded without triviality. The admission does not carry a commitment to everything being true (i.e. it does not carry a commitment to what we might term **trivialism** – the view that everything is true).

— Dov M. Gabbay, John Woods, in

**trivialism**, the doctrine that everything is actually true .

— Graham Priest, in Dov M. Gabbay, Franz Guenthner Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume 11, Springer, 31 March 2004, p.273

I know of no discussion which has degenerated into **trivialism** into trivilaism, except in moments of jest .

— Koji Tanaka, et al., in

**trivialism** arises from the idea that mathematics is classical and there is contradiction in mathematics, and therefore (under our old classical reasoning), all of mathematics is true , we then get to the meaninglessness of any particular mathematical statement and wallow in our degenerate theory .

— Koji Tanaka, et al., in "Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications: Logic and Applications", p.296